Foreign Interference in our democratic processes

Justice Committee Inquiry into the 2017 General Election and 2016 Local Election

24 April 2019
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1. Introduction
We welcome consideration of interference in elections

1.1 Thank you for re-opening submissions to consider foreign interference in New Zealand’s elections. InternetNZ's concerns and expertise relate to the Internet, so our submission focuses on online aspects of foreign interference in elections. We do not address the risk that donations to political parties are made by foreign governments or entities.

1.2 We address the ability of foreign powers to hack the private emails of candidates or parties in part one of our submission.

1.3 We divide the risk that political campaigns based through social media can be made to appear as though they are domestic but are, in fact, created or driven by external entities into:

   a) delivering transparency for online election advertising
   b) monitoring influence campaigns targeting New Zealand’s democracy.

1.4 This submission follows on from our previous submission to the Committee on the issue of foreign influence campaigns and disinformation.¹ We offer a summary of evidence on disinformation and influence campaigns overseas in Appendix A.

1.5 We would welcome the opportunity to appear in person to speak to this submission. Please contact our policy team on policy@internetnz.net.nz to arrange our oral submission.

2. Campaigns need protection from cyber-threats

2.1 Risks of emails being hacked are one example of a cyber-threat to political campaigns in New Zealand. Candidates and political parties face a variety of threats online, which require both broad and targeted responses.

2.2 Addressing targeted attacks requires tailored advice, which this submission cannot provide. If you have concerns about your own cybersecurity you should seek out the advice of a cybersecurity professional and your first port of call should be Parliament’s information security team.

¹ We spoke to the Committee on these issues on November 8 2018, see our blog post at https://internetnz.nz/blog/talking-parliament-about-disinformation (9 November 2018).
Campaigns are a confirmed target for cyber-threats

2.3 Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the equivalent of New Zealand's GCSB, reports on a variety of confirmed hacking activities targeting political campaigns. These activities aim to:

a) steal sensitive campaign documents
b) steal a party’s voter information (eg for targeting disinformation)
c) release unauthorised information (eg to online or local media)
d) impede use of the campaign’s devices and networks.

2.4 These targeted actions against campaigns are much broader than attempts to access email.

All candidates need support to be safe online

2.5 Cyber-threats are varied, but there are some basic steps that offer a starting point to be safer online. CERT NZ are the experts on protecting New Zealanders from cyber-threats. Their list of ten “Critical Controls” offer the key steps to protect against the most common cybersecurity problems CERT NZ's staff see.

2.6 Experience in the United States has prompted the development of a Cybersecurity Campaign Playbook, designed by a non-partisan group of campaign and cybersecurity professionals. We recommend work to create a trusted, credible NZ equivalent of the Belfer Center’s Cybersecurity Campaign Playbook by 2020.

We recommend that candidates and campaigns seek help with basic steps to promote their safety online, starting with CERTNZ

Campaigns need an expert advisor on cyber-threats

2.7 Some online threats can be addressed by improving on basic security practices. However, political campaigns need support to address targeted attacks. We think CERT NZ is the natural agency to take up that role, but this will require addressing two main challenges. CERTNZ is now hosted within a central government department (MBIE), and may need greater independence to help with campaigns. CERTNZ will also need extra resources to support for specialist advice to political campaigns.

We recommend that the Committee consider which organisation(s) would be best placed to work with political parties and candidates, to support their cybersecurity in local and general elections.

We recommend Crown funding for work to help campaigns address cyberthreats.

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4 Belfer Center, Cybersecurity campaign playbook here: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cybersecurity-campaign-playbook
3. Campaign transparency is needed online

Transparency: who says, who pays, who shares?

3.1 Our election rules should allow New Zealanders to engage in good faith online and offline, but should protect against outside influences which would undermine democratic trust and transparency using online tools.

Figure One: Campaign activities and New Zealand’s democracy

Online campaigns offer new threats to transparency

3.2 Current election laws recognise the importance of transparent election campaigns. However, rules designed for print and broadcast media do not work well for modern online election campaigns. Online campaigns are different, putting at risk the idea that New Zealanders can see who is seeking office, who is funding campaigns, and how campaigns are working to influence opinions and votes (see Table One below).

Table One: Online campaigns are different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Online advertising can allow broader reach at lower cost than print or broadcast media.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymity</td>
<td>Anonymous actors can target New Zealanders. Overseas actors can pose as New Zealanders engaging in good faith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas media</td>
<td>Campaigns can be coordinated from overseas, and delivered to New Zealanders through overseas platforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>Targeted advertising or social sharing allows messages to be shared to particular audiences, without being visible to local campaigns, journalists, or other New Zealanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>Online messages and advertising can be shared instantly, and can be linked to news stories and events in real-time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automation</td>
<td>Computer-driven “bot” accounts can amplify messages or disrupt online conversations between New Zealanders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Social sharing

| Overseas actors can promote social sharing of their messages to influence New Zealanders. |
| Targeting allows extreme messages to be shared without broader visibility or accountability. |

### Deliver transparency for online election advertising

3.3 To protect trust in our democratic processes, we need to extend and update election laws to protect transparent election campaigns online, so voters know who is involved in funding, creating, and sharing messages. Canada’s new *Elections Modernization Act* addresses online risks, and offers one useful model for protecting online campaign transparency.⁵

**Resource the Electoral Commission with rules and tools**

3.4 The Electoral Commission regulates elections, with objectives that include maintaining confidence in the administration of the electoral system.⁶ Part of its role is to administer election advertising rules. We think there is a clear case to consider how election advertising rules should be updated to apply effectively online.

*We recommend resourcing the Electoral Commission to review and implement requirements for transparent online election advertising*

*We recommend considering online tools to allow easy compliance, monitoring, and public reporting of election advertising as open data through the Electoral Commission*

3.5 The window after an election and before a coalition Government has been agreed is a key period for our democratic processes under MMP. We remain concerned that this could be targeted by campaigns to influence the shape or policy commitments of a coalition Government.

*We recommend that regulation of online campaigns is extended to include the post-election, pre-government formation time period.*

### Review spending limits for online election advertisements

3.6 Current rules allow anonymous, unregistered parties to spend up to $13,000 on campaign advertising. That amount may be reasonable for offline campaigns, but does not make sense for online advertising.

*We recommend consideration of lower thresholds to register online election campaigns based on their potential reach and impact*

### Require cooperation of online advertising platforms

3.7 The largest platforms for online advertising around the world and in New Zealand are Google and Facebook. Both offer tools to monitor and report on election advertising. Google includes political advertising as part of its Transparency Report, but this feature is currently only available for India and

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⁶ Electoral Act 1993, s 4C(c)
the United States of America. Facebook offers a tool for viewing political issue advertising targeting a country by topic and by total spending.

We recommend requiring online platforms to report election advertisements targeting New Zealanders.

We recommend scaling obligations of online platforms based on their global resources and activity levels in New Zealand.

Ban foreign election advertising during election campaigns

3.8 Current election laws in New Zealand require a named promoter who is accountable for candidate, party, or third-party campaigns. We think the same principle should apply to online advertising, requiring a natural person in New Zealand to register and be accountable for election advertising during campaigns.

We recommend that online election advertisements require a natural person in New Zealand to register as a promoter with the Electoral Commission, before advertisements can be placed through platforms.

Update and increase penalties for serious breaches

3.9 Current financial penalties in the Electoral Act are limited to $40,000, or $100,000 for very serious breaches. These amounts are not enough to motivate difficult compliance steps from large online platforms, which can have revenues in the hundreds of billions per year.

3.10 We recognise that current large online platforms do make some efforts to support election transparency. However, New Zealand should not take this for granted.

We recommend consideration of larger financial penalties, including penalties based on a percentage of global revenue, for breaches of New Zealand election law.

4. Monitor influence operations during and between campaigns

Is there foreign election interference? How can we tell?

4.1 Informal online sharing allows overseas actors to influence democratic processes, in ways that are not readily addressed through advertising laws. We think it is vital to monitor influence activities targeting New Zealand, through credible, well-resourced, and independent agencies.

Deliver ongoing monitoring of outside influences

4.2 As a fundamental step to protect trust in our democracy, New Zealand needs effective monitoring and reporting of outside influences targeting our democratic system. To be effective, this monitoring and reporting must be credible, independent, and able to adapt quickly as outside threats change.

4.3 Election advertising is only one method by which outside actors may try to influence our democracy. The most dangerous influence campaigns are those...

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7 Google, Google transparency Report [https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/home]
8 Facebook, Facebook Ad Library, [https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads]
which mimic legitimate democratic engagement, and which seek to imitate and provoke engagement by New Zealanders, particularly online.

4.4 As set out below, we think it is important to have independent monitoring of our democracy on different time scales:

a) **Detection within the election period**, allowing quick responses to influence campaigns as they emerge

b) **Reflection over time**, with continuous monitoring by a trusted and independent agency to report on influences in our democracy

**Detecting influence operations: an election “war room”**

4.5 To respond to emerging influence operations, immediate information is needed on messages targeting New Zealand’s political system, through content, targeted advertising, or patterns of online sharing. In the busy election period, journalistic or political responses may not be sufficient.

4.6 We think New Zealand needs a dedicated agency to monitor, report on, and coordinate responses to influence operations during the election period. Online platforms are a logical partner, because they have access to information who starts, shares and sees campaign messages. For example, Facebook has operated an election “war room” to address misinformation in overseas election campaigns.³ We think a domestic agency is needed to coordinate with online platforms, to ensure reporting facilities meet New Zealand’s needs, and to monitor and report in a way that reflects New Zealand’s norms and culture.

4.7 This function overlaps to some extent with the Electoral Commission’s monitoring of election advertising in the election period, with NetSafe’s role as Approved Agency responding to harmful communications online, and with CERTNZ’s role monitoring and responding to cyberthreats.

   **We recommend resourcing an independent agency to monitor, report on, and coordinate responses to influence operations during the election period.**

   **We recommend consulting with the Electoral Commission, NetSafe, and CERTNZ on the design and home for this function.**

**Reflecting on influences: an Internet observatory**

4.8 To address risks to democratic trust, New Zealand needs routine monitoring and reporting of political campaigns targeting New Zealanders.

4.9 To block external efforts to sow division, monitoring should consider the authenticity, sharing, reach and targeting of messages, in the same way that traditional rules have considered funding and broadcast advertising activity. This requires ongoing, credible work outside our Electoral Commission, which must retain a focus on the election process. Options include an office of Parliament, a component of Parliamentary Services or a dedicated research centre at a New Zealand University.

   **We recommend that the Committee calls for an independent Internet Observatory to monitor foreign influence campaigns.**

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³ ‘Inside Facebook’s Election War Room - The Verge’
5. Conclusion

5.1 Thank you for reading our submission. We would welcome the opportunity to present to the Committee in person.

Yours sincerely,

Ben Creet
Policy Manager
Appendix 1: Disinformation and campaigns targeting elections

Elections are global targets for overseas influence

1. Research shows that overseas actors are targeting democratic elections around the world. The Oxford Internet Institute records 48 influence campaigns affecting elections between 2010 and 2018.\textsuperscript{10} Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the equivalent of New Zealand's GCSB, regularly reports on threats to democracy. The 2019 CSE report notes:
   a. half of national elections in OECD countries during 2018 were targets for cyber threat activity (a threefold increase since 2015)\textsuperscript{11}
   b. of online threats targeting democratic processes since 2010, 88% were strategic efforts to influence outcomes\textsuperscript{12}
   c. coordinated online campaigns targeting voter behaviour are the most common online threat to democratic processes.\textsuperscript{13}

2. Coordinated efforts to influence overseas elections are increasingly common, and are increasingly targeting OECD countries like New Zealand.

\textbf{Figure Two: Democratic processes are increasingly targeted by cyber-threats}\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Percent of democratic processes targeted}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item 2015: 10.2% All countries, 15.4% OECD countries
\item 2016: 20.0% All countries, 30.0% OECD countries
\item 2017: 18.0% All countries, 43.8% OECD countries
\item 2018: 23.2% All countries, 50.0% OECD countries
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{10} Oxford Internet Institute: \textit{Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation} \url{https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2018/}
\textsuperscript{12} CSE: Cyber threats (2019).
\textsuperscript{13} CSE: Cyber threats (2019).
\textsuperscript{14} Data and figure adapted from Figure 5 in CSE: Cyber threats 2019, p 16.
Overseas actors targeting elections have strategic goals

3. Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) summarises the immediate, medium and long term goals of foreign powers who interfere in nations’ the democratic processes (see Figure Three below).

Figure Three: Foreign power motivations for interference in democratic processes

- **Immediate goals**
  - Affect popularity of candidates
  - Promote desired election outcomes
  - Create doubts about election processes

- **Mid-term goals**
  - Polarise political discourse
  - Weaken confidence in leaders

- **Long-term goals**
  - Reduce confidence in democracy
  - Promote foreign interests on economics, ideology, military
  - Create divisions in international alliances

Russia’s Internet Research Agency

Internet Research Agency (IRA) is a Russian company which, as documented by Oxford University researchers, “launched an extended attack on the United States by using computational propaganda to misinform and polarize US voters” from at least least 2013 to 2018. Through social media, the IRA created fake online identities, and targeted messages to different political groups to drive intense social conflicts. During the US election in 2016, the IRA encouraged activity by local activist groups,

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15 Data and figure adapted from Figure 2 in CSE: Cyber threats 2019, p 11.
New Zealand is a likely target for influence campaigns

4. A recent survey shows New Zealanders have high levels of confidence in its democracy.18 New Zealand plays a visible role in international institutions and trade agreements. These traits are positive for a democratic society but could make New Zealand a target for foreign interference. New Zealand holds several of the vulnerability factors that have been shown to make a society vulnerable to disinformation campaigns:19

Figure Four: Vulnerability factors for disinformation campaigns

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Diverse populations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>External divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The presence of minorities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>A vulnerable media ecosystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Internal divisions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Contested institutions</td>
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